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DATA MINING AND SUBSTANDARD MEDICAL PRACTICE: THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRIVACY, SECRETS AND HIDDEN DEFECTS
BARRY R. FuRRow*

I.

INTRODUCTION

WAE live in tense times. We worry about government surveillance and
corporate snooping.1 We fear misuse of our private information.
We properly value privacy: it is a desirable end state and a precondition for
identity, allowing individuals to achieve goals such as autonomy and solidarity with peers; it may protect the vulnerable from exposure to stigma
and other harms in the larger world; it may allow us an essential space for
our own thoughts and a chance to develop heretical ideas. 2 But we also
know that privacy is a complex idea-that concealment of secrets by
others may do us harm. At the same time, we fear that information critical
to our safety will not be properly discovered and analyzed. Both the government and the private sector increasingly use "data mining"-that is,
the application of database technology and techniques (such as statistical
analysis and modeling) to uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships in data, and to infer rules that allow for the prediction of future
results. Many federal data mining efforts involve the use of personal information mined from databases maintained by public and private sector organizations. A recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) study found
that out of 199 data mining efforts identified, 122 used personal information. " For these efforts, the primary purposes were detecting fraud, waste
and abuse; detecting criminal activities or patterns; analyzing intelligence
and detecting terrorist activities; and increasing tax compliance. 4 Most
recently, a political controversy has erupted over the use by the National
Security Agency of its computer capability to mine millions of email
* Professor of Law, Director, Health Law Program, Drexel University College
of Law.
1. See John Markoff, Government Looks at Ways to Mine Databases, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2006, at C1 (describing new techniques used by governments to discover
information about private citizens).
2. I have discussed the broader ramifications of privacy in Barry R. Furrow,
Doctors' Dirty Little Secrets: The Dark Side of Medical Privacy, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 283
(1998) (noting secrets kept from patients in medical context could lead to great
harm to patients). For an excellent discussion of the range of privacy claims, see
generally Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1088 (2002)
(providing history of privacy law and advancing new, pragmatic approach to conceptualizing privacy).
3. See generally GOV'T ACCOUNT OFFICE (GAO), DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES, GAO-04-548 (2004) [hereinafter DATA MIN-

ING] (summarizing various uses of data mining by government).

4. See id.
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messages in a search for terrorist threats. 5 Data mining is clearly a valuable tool if surrounded by proper safeguards.
The health care system unfortunately lacks systematic data collection
and error reduction. The problem is not always that a provider-whether
hospital, physician or clinic-is hiding poor performance as a secret. The
problem more often is that flaws are buried in masses of data, hidden even
from the awareness of the provider. 6 My focus is on the use of data mining of hospital patient information to better promote high quality care,
particularly within the hospital setting, where most risky and invasive procedures are performed. The use of computer-generated statistical profiles
of provider performance and patient outcomes is likely to move health
care toward a difficult and defensive environment, at least in the near
term, as providers struggle to disentangle themselves from a data web that
shows them to be outliers-poor performers. Such data profiling, however, will provide hospitals with an opportunity to improve performance
and will help physicians improve by recognizing their weaknesses.
I will use examples from recent staff privilege cases to examine the
effects of computer programs in detecting poor quality care; evaluate the
use of quality measurements and their effect on providers; and consider
the implications of this move toward use of aggregate patient data through
computer profiling. Such data mining and its revelations are necessary to
achieve a safer and more effective health care system. In fact, providers
who fail to collect data persistently using tools like data mining are, in my
judgment, negligent. If properly used, the findings of data mining can
focus on the essentials of performance while providing protections for
physician and patient privacy. Unfortunately, the regulatory approach has
too often allowed concealment of defects, at least from the prying eyes of
the outside world. In a health care economy where performance matters,
as measured by both positive and negative patient outcomes, we may be
less tempted to tinker with the legal system to force disclosure of provider
secrets.
II.

THE MEANING OF PRIVACY IN THE HEALTH CARE SETTING

Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in the
minds of others; rather it is the control we have over information
about ourselves.
-Charles

7

Fried

5. See Walter Pincus, NSA Gave Other U.S. Agencies Informationfrom Surveillance;
Fruit of EavesdroppingWas Processed and Cross-Checked with Databases,WASH. POST, Jan.
1, 2006, at A8 (outlining how NSA uses certain phone, fax and email records in
attempts to discover terrorist connections).
6. See Elizabeth A. McGlynn & Robert H. Brook, Keeping Quality on the Policy
Agenda, 20 HEALTH Arrs. 82, 85-86 (2001) (identifying problems within health care
system, specifically that data known by particular hospitals does not accurately reflect what is really happening within that hospital).
7. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 475 (1968).
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What are our concerns when we invoke the mantra of "privacy"? One
commentator defines privacy as three related clusters of ideas: (1) physical
space-"the extent to which an individual's territorial solitude is shielded
from invasion by unwanted objects or signals"; (2) choice-"an individual's ability to make certain significant decisions without interference";
and the (3) flow of personal information-"an individual's control over
the processing-i.e., the acquisition, disclosure and use-of personal information."8 By contrast, Daniel Solove lists six characterizations of privacy values:
(1) the right to be let alone-Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis's famous formulation for the right to privacy; (2) limited access to the self-the ability to shield oneself from unwanted
access by others; (3) secrecy-the concealment of certain matters
from others; (4) control over personal information-the ability
to exercise control over information about oneself; (5) personhood-the protection of one's personality, individuality, and
dignity; and (6) intimacy-control over, or limited access to,
one's intimate relationships or aspects of life. 9
In light of Solove's categories, pervaded by concealment and secrets,
it is clear that our uses of privacy may be less than admirable. Our definition of privacy may depend on the concealment of secrets desired by
others either to protect themselves or to make their own educated choices.
For example, we can manipulate others through their ignorance of our
secrets, denying them knowledge that would damage our credibility if disclosed (such as a car's collision damage hidden during sale, a commercial
pilot's cocaine use during flights or a person's HIV-positive status). Recasting private information as "secrets" moves our understanding toward a
sense of the illicit, the impermissibly hidden. Secrets are double-edgedwhile we tend to view privacy as an unalloyed good, 10 we conceal to keep
our secrets-and that concealment is the act of lying to others.
In the health care setting, our primary focus is on patient fears that
personal information might leak out to their detriment, such as conditions
that will affect their insurance, employment status or stigmatize them in
some way. In addition, providers also worry about personal information
that may endanger their livelihood, such as an HIV/AIDS status or sub-

8. SeeJerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,50 STAN. L. REv.

1193, 1202-03 (1998) (outlining "three clusters" definition of privacy).
9. Solove, supra note 2, at 1092.
10. See generally Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1964) (concluding that invasion of
privacy is affront to human dignity); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 475
(1968) (examining right of privacy with regard to "the reasons why men feel that
invasKons of that right injure them in their very humanity").
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stance abuse." Often, privacy in health care blends information control
with secrecy.
The advent of computer-based patient records, inexorable pressures
to adopt linked computer systems with access to patient treatment information, and the use of the Internet to easily share information have all
increased our worries about how to protect data leakage or theft. The
obvious benefits of computerized record keeping have propelled medical
records to a central position in health care delivery. 12 A standardized
database of patient information has the potential to promote efficiency,
outcomes,
further competition and allow providers to better track patient
13
so long as patient privacy interests are properly respected.
Privacy rights are often little more than a grant of rights to privacy
holders to control strategic secrets about themselves-secrets withheld to
get someone else to act in a particular way. If the motivation for hiding
information is to deceive, then privacy protects fraud. Is there any good
reason to let people have property rights in secret information about
themselves that will discredit them if revealed?1 4 In the abstract, the answer is clearly no. In the medical environment, the guiding principle
should be discovery of "secrets" and harvesting of data regarding defects
in the system. Ultimately, concealment in medicine can do great harm to
patients.
A.

Information Control

Control over our information and its dissemination to others is of
most interest to me in the context of medical errors and patient injury.
President Clinton's Information Infrastructure Task Force has defined privacy as "an individual's claim to control the terms under which personal
information-information identifiable to the individual-is acquired, disclosed and used." 15 The Supreme Court has stated that privacy is "control
over information concerning his or her person." 16 Such definitions beg
11. See generally Doe v. Medlantic Health Care Group, Inc., 814 A.2d 939 (D.C.
2003) (discussing suit for breach of confidentiality by hospital for revealing patient's AIDS status).
12. See generally Nicholas P. Terry, To HIPAA, a Son: Assessing the Technical, Conceptual, and Legal Frameworksfor Patient Safety Information, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 137
(2005) (highlighting impact of technology on patient information).
13. It is also clear that we have a long way to go to incorporate electronic
records and computerized systems in the complex health care enterprise.
14. See INST. OF MED., HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE: USE, DISCLOSURE, AND PRIVACY (M.S. Donaldson and K.N. Lohr eds., 1994); OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN COMPUTERIZED MEDICAL INFORMATION, OTATCT-576 (1993) (presenting report examining problems relating to health care
privacy, curative proposals and privacy models); Paul M. Schwartz, The Protectionof
Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 295, 306-09 (detailing privacy concerns within health care sector).
15. CLINTON'S INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE (IITF): PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING AND USING PERSONAL INFORMATION 5

(1995).

16. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989).
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the harder question: to what extent do health care providers and health
care institutions have privacy rights to control information that may prove
damaging to them? 17 Privacy cannot be simply a claim that an individual
can decide what information about himself or herself may be disclosed.
Privacy in the form of secrets may in fact violate moral principles of avoiding harm to others. The parameters of a definition of privacy rights also
concern what society decides is deserving of protection.
Privacy protections serve important functions in our society. But
while health care providers such as physicians and nurses deserve privacy
as citizens, their power over patients as providers exposes potential risks.
Medical secrecy therefore deserves close scrutiny as a protected right. We
have long been worried about patient information and its possible leakage
into the wrong hands-blackmailers, thieves or simply marketing profilers
who disclose their information to businesses seeking either to find new
customers, or to avoid problematic ones. Such leakage and resulting damage have occurred in the past simply because of the porosity of hospitals
and their frequent inability to protect vulnerable patient information.
We also know that physicians may lie about their secrets, such as substance abuse problems, failing vision, depression and slipping performances. Here we typically trust the institutions in which they work,
primarily hospitals, to police their secrets, ferret them out and take appropriate action without requiring a physician to stigmatize herself or himself
by disclosing personal problems to patients.18 As an illustration, consider
the physician in Semeraro v. Connolly. 19 In the case, the plaintiff was referred to Dr. Connolly, a specialist in colorectal cancer, for testing of her
colon. While performing a colonoscopy, Dr. Connolly discovered a polyp
growth on her colon, which was then promptly removed. Subsequently,
he was unable to determine if the polyp was completely removed, due to
poor preparation of her colon area. Six years later, during the plaintiffs
examination by another colorectal cancer specialist, a large polyp growth
and tumor on her colon had to be removed.
17. See, e.g., Ian Goldberg et al., Trust, Ethics, and Privacy, 81 B.U. L. REv. 407,
418 (2001) ("We build our own definition of privacy on what we consider the most
elegant definition, 'informational self-determination,' which refers to a person's
ability to control the flow of his own personal information."). In their famous
article on the right to privacy use and the language of information control, Warren
and Brandeis stated:
The common law secures to each individual the right of determining,
ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others ....
[E]ven if he has chosen to give them expression, he generally retains the power to fix the limits of the publicity
which shall be given them.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HRv. L. REv. 193,
198 (1890).
18. See Furrow, supra note 2, at 291-96 (outlining reasons for not mandating
physician disclosure to patients of their personal flaws).
19. No. CIV.A.92-4636, 1992 WL 392621 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 1992).
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After her initial treatment with Dr. Connolly, the plaintiff discovered
that Dr. Connolly retired from the practice of medicine in 1987 due to the
"deterioration of his sight, coordination and mental facilities."2 0 Eventually, he was diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease and died in 1990. Plaintiff
sued, arguing that Dr. Connolly failed to reveal the deterioration of his
skills to her in 1984 or any time thereafter, and that if she had been notified of his condition she would have refused treatment. She also proposed
a duty of disclosure at the time of Dr. Connolly's retirement to all patients.
The court held that the informed consent doctrine "does not allow recovery for failure to reveal information pertaining to the personal characteristics of the physician." 21 Quoting from an earlier case rejecting disclosure
of a physician's alcoholism,2 2 the court stated:
Matters such as personal weaknesses and professional credentials
of those who provide health care are the responsibility of the hospitals employing them, the professional corporations who offer
their services, or the associations that are charged with oversight.
Their failure to fulfill their obligations in this regard becomes a
matter of negligence, and it is from them that recovery must be
23
sought.
We want our institutions to have the tools, and the willingness to use them,
to determine which providers pose risks to patients. Therefore, it is the
information gathered and stored by hospitals that is most central to patient safety, and it should be the least protected by privacy principles.
B.

Defect Detection in Institutions

Concerns about the privacy of patient medical information have intensified with the growth of both electronic record keeping and the Internet. The federal government studied this problem for several years
before developing a highly detailed set of standards for health care providers. The Medical Privacy Standard of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") 24 was drafted and implemented to
create a new range of patient rights, protecting their medical information
in light of the implementation of the patient electronic medical record.
The Medical Privacy rules of HIPAA offer a "minimum necessary" rule to
disclosure and use of patient information. 25 HIPAA has moved the focus
20. Id. at *2.
21. Id.

22. See generally Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (rejecting
claim that physician's alcoholism should have been disclosed, along with absence
of license to practice in Pennsylvania).
23. Id. at 217.
24. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 82,462 (proposed Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and
164).

25. SeeJames G. Hodge, The Intersection of FederalHealth Information Privacy and
State Administrative Law: The Protection of Individual Health Data and Workers' Compenhttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss4/3
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of medical privacy toward the institution, limiting its disclosures and discussions. It has moved medical records privacy beyond the current rigid
26
Alcommon law approach that places the responsibility on physicians.
though HIPAA offers incomplete patient protection, it has made medical
record keeping and patient information a central and regulated aspect of
hospital practice. In addition, as part of the larger regulatory effort to
promote the electronic patient record, HIPAA provides a fertile underpinning for data mining of medical errors and problems that develop.
Control over information as an aspect of privacy is only part of the
problem in the health care setting. The harder questions stem from how
such information is collected, processed and used. The very value of this
information is that it is aggregated, subjected to a bureaucratic process
that can have built-in protections, and the individual provider informed
how the information is processed and used. We move beyond privacy concerns to those of institutional due process under staff privilege by-laws and
27
other safeguards.
Medical secrets fall into three categories: patient medical secrets, physician secrets and organizational secrets. The patient may fear revelation
of his secrets to a health care provider-nurse, physician or hospitalbecause they may be rebroadcast by physicians to staff and then on to the
outside world. 28 Or the patient may fear that instead of a sloppy rebroadcast, a pointed inquiry by a particular third party will disclose the information and intrude into the seclusion so carefully constructed. 29 Health care
providers are notoriously porous vessels, revealing patient confidential information at alarming rates. Medical record privacy is a current concern
for patients in light of the pressure for more information, computer linksation, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 117, 127-36 (1999) (describing various aspects of HIPAA
as relating to medical privacy); INST. FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH AND POLIcy, GEORGETOWN UNIV., HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, THE STATE OF HEALTH PRIVACY: AN

UNEVEN TERRAIN (July 1999), http://www.healthprivacy.org (discussing current
problems with privacy in health care sector).
26. See Terry, supra note 12, at 405 (arguing "the institutional provider will
become the default defendant in informed consent cases").
27. See Solove, supra note 2, at 1154 (moving towards due process model with
respect to privacy concerns instead of standard privacy law).
28. See generally Doe v. Marselle, 675 A.2d 835 (Conn. 1996) (discussing disclosure of plaintiffs HIV-positive status by employee of surgeon); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 451 (1995) (discussing privacy in
health care sector generally with focus on why patients might not want their information revealed); Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Privacy and Security of Health Information in the Emerging Health Care System, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 1 (1995) (same).
29. See generallyJudice v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 919 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. La.
1996) (presenting situation where neurosurgeon was recovering alcoholic); McDaniel v. Miss. Baptist Med. Ctr., 877 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (determining
whether medical center employee terminated due to drug use violated ADA); Altman v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 903 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (presenting situation where physician was recovering alcoholic).
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30
ages of computerized patient files for insurance and other purposes.
HIPAA's Medical Privacy Standards are a compromise approach to this
problem, granting some privacy rights while limiting remedies for curing
breaches of privacy.
Institutions that we depend on for goods and services may have
secrets, information that if released would cause us to avoid their goods
and services, criticize them or take other steps damaging to them. Given
their complexity, institutions may be toxic, producing harm without
awareness. They may also have hidden flaws, undiscovered perils lurking
within their operating environment-accidents about to happen, workers
on the edge, flaws that have yet to materialize-in other words, as yet undiscovered risks. These defects are not secrets, because they are not
known and therefore concealed. Rather, they are buried defects, concealed in masses of unanalyzed data, with possible patterns simply not detected by the institutions.
Such patterns can be uncovered by computer data mining. Here, my
concern is specifically hidden sources of bad patient outcomes or substandard performance generally in the hospital setting. Undiscovered sources
of provider error, system failures and harm to patients may be even more
deadly. They are not secrets in a sense because the provider is not concealing information it already knows and is worried about disseminating.
Rather, the knowledge is more like a hidden flaw that must be uncovered
and extirpated before more damage is done. Like a stress line in a metal
tool or an aneurysm in someone's brain, these flaws are increasingly discoverable within health care institutions. And if discovered, they can often
be fixed. The solutions may include staff or hospital actions against a
toxic physician, a repair to a flawed system of medication delivery, medical
device procurement or an improved computer entry system. But solutions
are not possible unless the hidden flaw is discovered. The tools of outcome measurement and data mining provide powerful tools for such
31
discovery.

III.

MEDICAL ERRORs: CONCEALED FLAWS

It may seem a strange principle to enunciate as the very first requirement in a Hospital that it should do the sick no harm.
3 2

-Florence Nightingale

Patients suffer unnecessary injuries and death at the hands of health
care providers, both because they receive substandard care and because
30. See Gostin, Health Information Privacy, supra note 28, at 454 (stating "pro-

tecting the confidentiality of medical records is an absolutely essential or very important part of national health care reform").

31. See generally Gary T. Marx & Nancy Reichman, Routinizing the Discovery of
Secrets: Computers As Informants, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 423 (1984) (discussing

problems with data mining broadly in civil liberties context).
32.

FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE, NOTES ON HOSPITALS
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they fail to get necessary and effective treatments."3 The Institute of
Medicine's 1999 projection of up to 98,000 deaths per year, 3 4 and hundreds of thousands of avoidable injuries and extra days of hospitalization, 35 has been enlarged by analyses that are more recent. A
HealthGrades analysis of Medicare data projected a casualty rate almost
twice the Institute of Medicine figures, or 195,000 deaths per year attributable to adverse medical events. 3 6 The Centers for Disease Control has
estimated that medical errors, if ranked as a disease, would be the sixth
leading cause of death in the United States, outranking deaths due to dia37
betes, influenza and pneumonia, Alzheimer's disease and renal disease.
Others rank health care, more generally defined, as the third leading
cause of death in this country. 38 Increasingly, Medicare patients are ex-

periencing a high level of errors.39 For example, patient infection studies
40
have found astonishing levels of preventable and often deadly infections.
Further, "[h]ospital-acquired infections rates worsened by approximately
20% from 2000 to 2003 and accounted for 9,552 deaths and $2.60 billion,
almost 30% of the total excess cost related to the patient safety incidents." 4 1 Moreover, unnecessary surgery, by one estimate, kills over
42
12,000 people each year.
33. I treat this issue of medical error and patient safety, seen as a broad regulatory problem, in Barry R. Furrow, RegulatingPatientSafety: Toward FederalModel of
Medical Error Reduction, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 1 (2005).
34. This projection has been criticized as based on a methodology that is
likely to overstate the death rate. See Rodney A. Hayward & Timothy P. Hofer,
Estimating Hospital Deaths Due to Medical Errors: Preventability Is in the Eye of the Reviewer, 286 JAMA 415, 415-20 (2001) (examining reliability of reviewers as cause
for overstatement of death rate).
35. See COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., To ERR Is
HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (L.T. Kohn,J.M. Corrigan & M.S. Donaldson eds., Nat'l Academy Press 2000) [hereinafter "IOM REPORT"].
36. See HEALTHGRADES, INC., SECOND ANNUAL PATIENT SAFETY IN AMERICAN
HOSPITALS REPORT (2005) (presenting and analyzing multitude of statistics outlining problems with patient deaths in hospitals).
37. See Nat'l Vital Statistics Report, Deaths: Preliminary Datafor 2002 Vol. 52,
No. 13 (Kenneth D Kochanek & Betty L. Smith eds., 2004) (analyzing cause of
death data and statistics, including data concerning hospital errors).
38. See Bruce Spitz &John Abramson, Whzen Health Policy Is the Problem: A Report
from the Field, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 326, 329 (2005) (providing statistics
regarding health care as cause of death).
39. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY (2005) (noting problems with current Medicare system and
advocating pay-for-performance method of payment to insure higher quality performance by hospitals and physicians).
40. See id. (offering example of medical error).
41. HEALTHGRADES, supra note 36, at 3.
42. See Barbara Starfield, Is U.S. Health Care Really the Best in the World?, 284
JAMA 483, 483 (2000) (noting unnecessary surgery as cause of high number of
deaths).
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The accumulating data on patient injury continues to startle any
outside observer. 43 At least three to four percent of all hospitalizations
give rise to adverse events.4 4 Provider-caused injury is a predictable feature of hospital care. 45 American medicine creates too much patient
harm, in spite of its technological prowess. 46 Moreover, much of this
harm is concealed-buried under a mass of data in complex and often
chaotic health care institutions. 47 Mining medical error data is crucial for
reducing the volume of medical adverse events suffered by patients in
American hospitals.

48

43. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) recently developed and released a set of Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) specifically designed for
screening administrative data for incidences of concern related to patient safety.
AHRQ is the lead agency for the U.S. government on quality in health care, sponsoring research that examines the frequency and cause of medical errors and testing techniques designed to reduce these mistakes. Using this measurement tool,
AHRQ identified the rates of, and excess length of stay and mortality associated
with, these specific patient safety indicators. Extrapolating from AHRQ's sample
data, representing approximately twenty percent of all U.S. hospitals (2000 Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project Nationwide Inpatient Sample), researchers estimated that the eighteen patient safety indicators evaluated contributed to $9.3
billion excess charges and 32,591 deaths in the United States annually. See HEALTHGRADES, INC., FIRST ANNUAL PATIENT SAFETY IN AMERICAN HOSPITALS REPORT (July
2004), http://www.healthgrades.com/media/english/pdf/HG_Patient_Safety_
StudyFinal.pdf; AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, PATIENT SAFETY
INDICATORS (Feb. 2006), http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/psi-overview.htm;
see also Bryan J. Weiner et al., Quality Improvement Implementation and HospitalPerformance on Patient Safety Indicators, 63 MED. CARE REs. & REv. 29 (2006).
44. See T.A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients:Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 13 QuAL. & SAF. HEALTH
CARE 145 (2004).
45. See David M. Studdert et al., Beyond Dead Reckoning: Measures of Medical
Injury Burden, Malpractice Litigation, and Alternative Compensation Models from Utah
and Colorado, 33 IND. L. REv. 1643, 1662 (2000) (noting high predictability of medical mishaps caused by hospitals and doctors). The Utah-Colorado Medical Practice Study (UCMPS) found that adverse events connected to surgery accounted for
about half (44.9%) of adverse events across both states, with only 16.9% of the
surgical adverse events involving negligence.

The authors concluded that the

UCMPS produced results similar to the earlier New York Harvard Study. Id.
46. See Mark R. Chassin et al., The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality,
280JAMA 1000, 1001 (1996) (highlighting various serious problems within United
States health care system).
47. One patient survey found that nearly twenty-two percent of patients had

experienced a medical error, with preventable adverse drug events the largest contributor to these errors, leading the Fund to project a much higher rate of patient
injury caused by medical errors and drug adverse events. See SHEILA LEATHERMAN
& DOUGLAS McCARTHY, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN
THE UNITED STATES: A CHARTBOOK 64 (2002) (discussing serious problem of physicians administering incorrect drugs to patients, leading to deaths).

48. See generally Lucian L. Leape, Reporting of Adverse Events, 347 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1633 (2002) (emphasizing importance of mining medical data for protection
of patients).
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Quality Assurance and Outcome Measurement

Modern computers allow sensitive health care data to be stored, transferred and used with ease. Given the sheer volume of data collected on
each patient, the movement to computerize patient records has been
pushed by pressures from the federal and state governments as well as
hospitals' desires for efficiency. As health care has blossomed into a complex industry, the organizations involved-from employers to drug companies and managed organizations-have a compelling interest in data to
control their costs, increase revenues and improve performance. Information has, as a result, become a central aspect of the health care enterprise. 49 For example, the American College of Surgeons has developed
the National Surgical Quality Improvement Program (ACS NSQIP), the
first nationally validated, risk-adjusted, outcomes-based program to measure and improve the quality of surgical care. 50 Concerns about medical
record privacy have grown as storage of digital information has become
51
more common.
49. See COMM. ON MAINTAINING PRIVACY & SEC. IN HEALTH CARE APPLICATIONS
OF THE NAT'L INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FOR THE RECORD:
PROTECTING ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION 25 (1997) (noting that more than
half of hospitals were investing in electronic medical records and market was expected to grow into $1.5 billion industry by 2000); Gostin, Health Information Privacy, supra note 28, at 452 (stating that high quality information is necessary for
informed decision-making); Paul Starr, Health and the Right to Privacy, 25 AM.J.L. &
MED. 193, 196 (1999) (discussing importance of health care data and informa-

tion). See generally David M. Studdert, Direct Contracts, Data Sharing and Employee
Risk Selection: New Stakes for PatientPrivacy in Tomorrow's Health InsuranceMarkets, 25
AM. J.L. & MED. 233 (1999) (describing potential problems regarding increased
access to health information).
50. See Am. COLL. OF SURGEONS, CONTINUOUS QUALITY IMPROVEMENT: ACS

http://www.facs.org/cqi/outcomes.html (last visited Apr.
22, 2006) (providing general overview of ACS NSQIP).
51. Violations of health information privacy fall into three major categories.
The first is abuse or misappropriated medical record information. For example,
the increased use of e-mail messages from patients to their physicians can lead to
the storage of these messages in the file, allowing the patient's own words to be
easily accessed. Patients may reveal too much in light of the casual and conversational attributes of e-mail messaging. Hackers may also gain access to hospital
medical record systems. Data security measures and sanctions against misuse can
reduce this problem. Second, health information may be used by institutions for
marketing and other commercial purposes. For example, the health care institution may sell patient prescription information to direct mail companies. Third,
organizations may abuse confidential patient health information in substantial and
serious ways that result in discrimination, loss of employment, insurance or other
welfare benefits. See Alissa R. Spielberg, Online Without a Net: Physician-PatientCommunication by Electronic Mail, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 267, 274 (1999) (describing how
OUTCOMES DATABASES,

physicians currently handle e-mail communications with clients and pitfalls regarding use of e-mail); Latanya Sweeney, Weaving Technology and Policy Together to Maintain Confidentiality, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 98 (1997). See generally OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF MEDICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS

50-51 (1997); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., PROTECTING PRIVACY IN
COMPUTERIZED MEDICAL INFORMATION 11-12 (1993) (describing some pitfalls regarding accumulation of medical data); Janlori Goldman, ProtectingPrivacy to Im-
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The evolution of quality assurance in health care entities has moved
toward continuous quality improvement, a method of constantly evaluating and changing health care with quality parameters in mind. 52 Continuous quality improvement requires a focus on comparative data as to
effectiveness of medical procedures, feedback and education of physicians
and development of practice guidelines that embody the research findings. Hospitals and managed care organizations actively engage in programs to promote high quality and effective practice, through
implementation of clinical algorithms, outcome based studies, application
of quality control principles from industry and large-scale analysis of practice patterns across plans. These programs of outcome management are
now being implemented in hospitals and managed care organizations
under pressure from the hospital accrediting body-the Joint Commission
on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)-and the fed53
eral government.
This change in focus within health care institutions toward quality improvement has been expedited by the rapid acceleration of information
gathering by health care institutions. Such information gathering by
health care institutions is likely to have two legal effects. First, it will lead
to demands for disclosure of such comparative success rates and outcome
data where available. 54 Current regulatory strategies are driven by the
idea of patients as consumers, and the value of quality information and
comparative data to both patients and payers as they evaluate care. Reporting of adverse events and near misses is an essential part of an information infrastructure. 55 The candidates for data reporting and public
prove Health Care, 17 HEALTH AFFs. 47 (1998) (detailing recent events that have
increased public's fear about misuse of medical data, including two instances
where pharmacies disclosed patient's prescription information to direct mail services and pharmaceutical companies); John D. Rootenberg, Computer-Based Patient
Records: The Next Generation of Medicine?, 267 JAMA 168, 168 (1992) (discussing advantages that result from using only computer-based patient records and doing
away with handwritten charts); INST. OF MED., THE COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT REcoRD: AN ESSENTIAL TECHNOLOGY FOR HEALTH CARE (1997), http://www.nap.edu/
readingroom/.
52. See generally CONTINUOUS QUALITY IMPROVEMENT IN HEALTH CARE: THEORY,
IMPLEMENTATIONS,

AND APPLICATIONS

3-33 (Curtis P. McLaughlin & Arnold D.

Kaluzny eds., 3d ed. 2006) (1999) (defining continuous quality improvement and
listing many characteristics of continuous quality improvement program).
53. See Solove, supra note 2, at 1090.
54. See generally Paul D. Rheingold, The Admissibility of Evidence in Malpractice
Cases: The Performance Records of Practitioners,58 BROOK. L. REV. 75, 80 (1992) ("It
does seem inescapable . . . that part of the information about risks would be what
the doctor's own experience has been, even if all risks are lumped together.");
Aaron D. Twerksi & Neil B. Cohen, Comparing Medical Providers:A First Look at the
New Era of Medical Statistics, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 12-13 (1992) (predicting that as
statistical validity of data is established, it will become part of litigation).
55. See Elizabeth A. McGlynn & Robert H. Brook, Keeping Quality on the Policy
Agenda, 20 HEALTH Arrs. 82, 86 (2001) (stating what authors believe are essential
requirements of effective information system).
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56
It
availability are many. One example is infection control report cards.
may be that a graphic depiction of a hospital's progress over time is more
useful than cross-institution comparisons. 5 7 Generating the reports in a
graphic way so that hospital providers can clearly see baselines and improvement is a goal worth mandating. The goal of data transparency,
however, may be valuable as much for internal learning and staff privileging decisions as for consumer and buyer shopping, at least in the short58
term.
The push toward electronic records and data gathering may also
change the standard of care for hospitals, leading to the use of data mining as a standard operating procedure. Comparative outcome data ultimately raises the possibility that such data must be gathered, evaluated
and used by hospitals and managed care organizations to reduce the risk
of harm to patients.

B.

Data Mining

The idea of systematically collecting and studying information of all
kinds on patient progress through a health care institution is not new. Dr.
Ernst Codman was one of the first to advocate a hardheaded approach to
data collection and error reduction. 59 Codman was a Boston doctor who
wanted hospitals and doctors to track their practices and evaluate outcomes of their patients, an ideal he developed around 1920.60 He offered
an "end-result system" based "'on the common-sense notion that every
56. See generally Robert A. Weinstein et al., Infection-ControlReport Cards-Securing Patient Safety, 353 NEw ENG. J. MED. 225 (2005) (suggesting that report cards
are important tool in analyzing health care providers).
57. See id.
We have also learned that we must select denominators carefully in order
to avoid artificial inflation or deflation of rates; that sophisticated information technology is required; and that it can be difficult to define useful
benchmarks ....

so that reporting a trend for a particular hospital may

provide more useful information than does comparing hospitals.
Id.
58. See Ashish K Jha et al., Care in U.S. Hospitals-The Hospital Quality Alliance
Program, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 265, 272 (2005).
Our findings indicate that quality measures had only moderate predictive
ability across the three conditions. Although a high quality of care for
acute myocardial infarction predicted a high quality of care for congestive heart failure, the former was only marginally better than chance at
identifying a high quality of care for pneumonia. These data do not provide support for the notion that "good" hospitals are easy to identify or
consistent in their performance across conditions. Our data suggest that
evaluations of hospitals' performance will most likely need to be based on
a large number of conditions.
Id.
59. See generally Susan Reverby, Stealing the Golden Eggs: Ernest Amory Codman
and the Science and Management of Medicine, 55 BULL. HIST. OF MED. 156 (1981)
(describing Dr. Ernst Codman's efforts to link standardized clinical care with hospital reform).
60. See id. at 168-69 (describing early attempts at hospital standardization).
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hospital should follow every patient that it treats, long enough to determine whether or not the treatment has been successful, and then to inquire 'ifnot, why not?' with a view to preventing similar failures in the
future.' "61

Codman's central idea was a complete patient record that included
assessments of why a treatment was unsuccessful-including discussion of
errors of technical knowledge or risk, lack of surgical judgment, lack of
care or equipment, lack of diagnostic skill, unconquerable disease, patient's refusal of treatment, calamities of surgery or accidents and complications over which doctors had no control. 6 2 This detailed record was to
serve an auditing function to evaluate, compare and establish benchmarks
for the performance of physicians and hospitals. Codman was ahead of his
time, hoping to assess a hospital's efficiency in therapeutic, outcome-based
terms. To Codman, patient harm due to infections or unnecessary or inappropriate operations was a hospital "waste product."63 His analogy of
bad outcomes to waste products was brilliant. 64 Data mining is different
from Codman's idea of systematically tracking each patient's progress explicitly through a health care system, a process that hospitals attempt to
varying degrees of success. Data mining, by contrast, is a computerized
hunt for patterns and causes; it is the process of automatic systematic
searching for patterns in large quantities of data. 6 5 It is a problem-solving
tool that analyzes existing data in large databases, through patterns represented in structures, patterns or clusters that can be used to inform future
decisions. 66 It extracts predictive information from these large databases,
finding hidden patterns that may lie outside viewer expectations or be invisible on a case-by-case basis.6 7 It is focused on hypothesis generation,
61. VIRGINIA A. SHARPE & ALAN I. FADEN, MEDICAL HARM: HISTORICAL, CONCEPTUAL, AND ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF IATROGENIC ILLNESS 29 (1998) (quoting Dr.
Ernst Codman). See generally Reverby, supranote 59 (detailing life and work of Dr.
Ernst Codman).
62. See Reverby, supra note 59, at 156.
63. See SHARPE & FADEN, supra note 61, at 31 (defining way Codman characterized things that could prevent unnecessary patient death).
64. Codman's work eventually led to the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO), which has slowly moved toward a more
outcome-based accreditation system.
65. Data mining lacks a precise meaning, because it includes a range of analytic activities, including data profiling, data warehousing, online analytical
processing and enterprise analytical applications. Other terms used include "factual data analysis" and "predictive analytics." The generally accepted definition is
"the application of database technology and techniques-such as statistical analysis
and modeling-to uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships in data and to
infer rules that allow for the prediction of future results." DATA MINING, supranote
3, at 1 (explaining how "data mining" was defined for purposes of study).
66. See IAN H. WITrEN & EIBE FRANK, DATA MINING: PRACTICAL MACHINE
LEARNING TooLs AND TECHNIQUES 5 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining how data mining
works and how it is utilized).
67. See D. Kopec et al., Human Errorsin Medical Practice:Systematic Classification
and Reduction with Automated Information Systems (Oct. 15, 2002), http://www.sci.
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not hypothesis testing (which may lead to missed associations). 68 This approach is especially appropriate for medical data, which often exists in vast
quantities in an unstructured format. Applying data mining techniques
can facilitate systematic analysis.
Data mining uses specialized software tools based on advanced search
algorithms, multiprocessor computers and massive databases to discover
knowledge that is often unexpected. Companies, such as IBM, with its
DB2 Intelligent Miner, 69 ACS's MIDAS+ Comparative Performance Measure System 70 and SPSS Inc.'s data mining software, 71 provide software
products to health care companies to allow them to mine large volumes of
72
data and harvest risk-related results and outcome comparisons.
Data mining can solve a range of tasks. 73 These may include: (1) predicting-learning a pattern from examples and using the model to predict
future values of the target variable; (2) classification-finding a function
that groups records into discrete classes; (3) detection of relationssearching for the independent variables for a selected target of variables;
(4) explicit modeling-finding explicit formulae describing dependencies
between various variables; (5) clustering-identifying groups of records
that are similar between themselves but different from the rest of the data;
and (6) deviation detection-determining the most significant changes in
some key measures of data from previous or expected values.
Data mining is therefore a powerful new addition to outcomes measurement, moving beyond tracking a particular patient to a satellite view of
the whole population of a hospital over time. Using pattern recognition
brooklyn.cuny.edu/-kopec/research/new/Final-J-Med-Sys-10 16-02.pdf
(describing use of automated systems to reduce human medical errors).
68. SeeJohn H. Holmes, Mining Health-RelatedData:Methods and Applications in
Research, Public Health, and Patient Care 14, http://infranet.uwaterloo.ca/inftalks/
2003-2004/2003-10-22/default.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2006) (reiterating focus of
data mining).
69. See IBM Software, DB2 Intelligent Miner, http://www.306.ibm.com/
software/data/iminer (last visited Apr. 22, 2006) (providing information about
IBM's DB2 Intelligent Miner software).
70. See Affiliated Computer Services, The MIDAS+ ComparativePerformanceMeasurement System: A Core Measure Solution, http://www.midasplus.com/cpmsfeal.html
(last visited Apr. 22, 2006) (describing program and features of MIDAS+ data mining software).
71. See SPSS, Healthcare: Ensuring Quality of Care, http://www.spss.com/verticalmarkets/healthcare/quality.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2006) (providing information about SPSS's data mining software).
72. See SPSS, Customers: San FranciscoHeart Institute, http://www.spss.com/success/templateview.cfm?StoryID-38 (last visited Apr. 22, 2006) (profiling San
Francisco Heart Institute's use of SPSS software). The Institute collects data to
evaluate patient risk, effectiveness of procedures and medications and physician
performance. Id.
73. See Megaputer Intelligence, What Is DataMining?, http://www.megaputer.
com/dm/dmlOl.php3 (last visited Apr. 22, 2006) (describing PolyAnalyst as one
commercially available program for data mining that advertises that it can perform
all functions listed).
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algorithms, data mining can be set to search databases to investigate particular problems. It can spot trends in infections using infection surveillance results. Alternatively, it can be used in a broader way to mine for
hidden problems, trends or other patterns that are fixable. IBM cites the
benefits of its DB2 Intelligent Miner, using as an example a Florida Hospital where data miners found that pneumonia patients who were not given
medication immediately upon admittance suffered significantly worse outcomes than those who were.7 4 At another facility, data mining showed
that patients with cardiovascular disease were not always prescribed betablockers because the discharge process did not include a crucial step to
ensure the prescription was ordered, and that an easy solution was to
change work processes.
IV.

THE LIMITS OF PROVIDER PRIVACY: OUTLIERS, DETECTABLE PATTERNS
AND HARM

[S]ecrets are also used as tools of power, wrenching advantage
from the unknowing actions of others. What we do not know
often does hurt us-and serves to benefit others who kept us in
the dark. Secrets provide the unobservable weapons of the
devious.
75
-Kim Lane Scheppele
Pure provider secrets may conceal treatment risks from patients.
Such secrets include information that a patient might like to know about
an individual physician in order to protect himself from harm at the hands
of that physician-a physician's alcoholism, mental or physical deterioration, contagious disease status and most important, his or her performance limitations. 76 Some private information may not be directly relevant
to patient risk, but its disclosure may stigmatize or otherwise damage the
health care provider. 77 Hospitals can detect some provider problems dur74. See Alex Veltsos, Getting to the Bottom of HospitalFinances:FloridaHospital, an
Experienced Data Miner, Stretches Its Extensive Use of Data Mining to Deliver Financial
Results That Will Improve Its Bottom Line-Data Warehousing/Mining,HEALTH MGMT.
TECH. (Aug. 2003), http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mODUD/is_8_
24/ai106474733 (providing first-hand description of Florida Hospital's use of
IBM's data mining software to improve hospital).
75. KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE
COMMON LAw 5 (1988).

76. See generally Doe v. Marselle, 675 A.2d 835 (Conn. 1996) (describing situation where patient's HIV-positive status was disclosed to members of community by
employee of surgeon); Gostin, Health Information Privacy, supra note 28 (describing
information that patients need in order to make informed decision about physicians); Gostin et al., Privacy and Security of Health Information in the Emerging Health
Care System, supra note 28; Schwartz, supra note 14, at 301 (explaining that there is
widening audience of outside observers now watching performances of doctors,
nurses and patients).
77. Disclosure of a physician's physical condition-for example, an addiction
like alcoholism-raises troubling legal issues. Certainly, an alcoholic surgeon may
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ing credentialing of physicians; other problems may not be detected, or
may develop later on.
Perhaps more important are the undiscovered sources of patient
harm-the connections, system processes or provider missteps that create
risks to patients. These flaws-the risks and near misses-are not secrets,
not yet, since secrecy implies information that is concealed; they are instead un-mined and therefore undiscovered ore. To what extent does a
provider owe a patient a duty not only to reveal and fix dangerous secrets
within his or her walls, but also to affirmatively mine his or her data relentlessly to ensure that other sources of patient harm do not exist, or are
detected and fixed? The standard of practice should reflect an obligation
to discover sources of human error and patterns of harm creation with the
goal of reducing and eliminating them.
I leave to others the protection of patient information. Neither individual providers nor organizations should have the kind of expectations of
privacy that patients are owed. Providers' privacy expectations should not
include performance limitations that may harm patients. What attracts me
about the proper use of data mining is its ability to spot patterns, trends
and comparative effects in a visual way, without the need to dig into the
patients' records in a hunt for gold, or into the physician's personal limitations in ways that may invade her privacy while being irrelevant to
78
performance.
A.
1.

InstitutionalResponsibility for Patterns

Staff PrivilegingActions

Data mining, as a subset of outcome measurement generally, may reveal patterns of substandard care. The fairest use of this information is at
the level of the institutional provider. The role of the institution and
peers in controlling these practices is central to reducing the risks, backstopped by the ever-present threat of a tort suit for damages. Hospital
medical staff tort law has focused on provider competency in articulating
the limits of negligent staff selection. Hospitals screen their medical staff
to reduce the level of risk of injury to their patient population, refusing to
credential high-risk physicians. Risk is defined by a competency/quality
definition. The standard is skills-based-assuming that a low level of skill
creates unnecessary risks to the patient-and outcome-based-looking to
impairments or other physician limitations that might increase risks to patients. Hospital staff privilege disputes increasingly reveal flaws within a
hospital that are detected by the use of computer analyses that spot
have an impairment that might seriously affect performance and thus success rate.
See Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213, 217 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (rejecting claim that
physician's alcoholism should have been disclosed, along with absence of license
to practice in Pennsylvania).
78. See id. at 213-17 (same).
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problems. Hospitals may then take steps to reduce patient harm based on
the data.
One example is the case of Unnamed Physician v. Board of Trustees of
Saint Agnes Medical Center.79 The hospital had used a Midas data mining

program as a part of the reappointment process, and the program generated a statistical analysis of outliers in the hospital physician's performance, including infection rates flagging the outlier physicians. 80 For the
period from January 1, 1999 to September 30, 1999, the appellant physician had a 14% infection rate from one procedure and a 7.9% overall
infection rate. This was quadruple the national rate for physicians in his
specialty. After a further peer review of the appellant's charts by an outsider review, the physician's staff privileges were limited. The Midas program played a useful preliminary role in identifying files that fell outside
the parameters of the program, generating a statistical flag that triggered
peer review of the appellant's charges.
A second case is Lo v. Provena Covenant Medical Center.81 A review of

patient statistics from the hospital's cardiovascular-surgery program revealed that Dr. Lo, one of two cardiovascular surgeons on the medical
staff, had a high rate of mortality compared to national norms (5.3% compared to 3%) and a high complication and readmission rate. For the two
cardiovascular surgeons on the hospital's staff, the mortality rate was 7%,
the rate of return to surgery after surgery was 13.1% and the rate of hospital readmission within thirty days was 19.3%. The mortality rate for plaintiff's patients was 5.3% in 2000, 5% in 2001 and 5% in 2002. By contrast,
during the same period, the national rate of mortality for open-heart surgery was 3% in 2000 and 2.3% in 2001. "The hospital itself has inherent
authority to summarily suspend clinical privileges to prevent an imminent
danger to patients. To that end, the chief executive officer can impose a
summary suspension on the authority of the hospital board." 82 The president of the medical center, faced with apparent unwillingness by the medical staff to get involved in the various limitations imposed on Dr. Lo, met
with the executive committee of the board of directors. The Committee
authorized President Friedman to suspend summarily plaintiff's clinical
privilege to perform open-heart surgery. The court held that if danger to
patients is genuine and imminent, the hospital governing board has a duty
to protect patients by summarily suspending the privilege of a physician
when data shows that a mortality rate is well above the norm.8 3
79. 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
80. ACS's Midas+ Comparative Performance Measurement System is a performance improvement software application that provides comparative data to
over 250 hospitals nationally, with large databases housing over fourteen million
encounters. See Affiliated Computer Services, supra note 70 (describing software).
81. 796 N.E.2d 607 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
82. Id. at 615 (internal citation omitted).
83. See id. at 614 (finding that "hospital has inherent right to summarily suspend the clinical privileges of a physician whose continued practice poses immediate danger to patients").
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Discovered data about performance may help a conscientious provider. For example, in Nugent v. Saint Agnes Medical Center,8 4 the hospital's
peer review committee conducted a ten-day evidentiary hearing and found
that Doctor 257's treatment of ten hospital patients showed deficiencies.
His infection rate for all orthopedic surgeries from January 1, 1999 to September 30, 1999 was 7.8% and for lumbar laminectomy/fusion procedures, it was 14%. No other physicians, including all other orthopedists at
St. Agnes, exceeded 4%. The information was surprising to the physician.
He implemented changes in his hospital practices, and the infection rate
for his patients dropped to zero, despite a statistically meaningful number
of surgeries, and the rate remained zero up to the time of trial.
What is the source of bad outcomes? It is often hard to identify. It
might be depression, substance abuse, lack of skill, poor team support in
the surgical suite, a flaw in the hospital pharmacy, a flaw in the hospital's
management or scheduling or records systems. The use of computer generated statistical profiles of provider performance and patient outcomes
will likely move health care toward a difficult and defensive environment,
at least in the near term, as providers struggle to disentangle themselves
from a data web that shows them to be outliers-poor performers. Staff
privilege cases show the power of computer programs like Midas in detecting poor quality care. Such profiling and comparative data use may be
protective of both providers with painful secrets and patients with confidential conditions that they want kept private. In a new health care economy where all that matters is performance-measured by positive patient
outcomes-we may have less motivation to tinker with the legal system to
force disclosure of provider secrets or to dig into patient confidential data
to explain bad performance.
2.

Corporate Negligence

A patient injured in the hospital may argue that the hospital was negligent in retaining a physician on the medical staff, if outcome data compiled by the hospital reveals that the physician was at the very bottom of
the staff profile. The corporate negligence doctrine, accepted in many
American states, defines a hospital's duties in four different areas: (1) reasonable care in maintaining safe and adequate facilities and equipment;
(2) selection and retention of competent physicians; (3) oversight of all
those who practice medicine within the hospital's walls; and (4) creation,
adoption and enforcement of policies adequate to ensure quality care for
85
patients.
Imagine a hospital with detailed risk information on all of its physicians, surgical teams and so on. If that hospital fails to act to limit staff
privileges, to shift staff around and to improve support in deficient areas, a
84. No. F043928, 2004 WL 2953326 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2004).
85. See, e.g., Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991) (listing
elements of corporate negligence doctrine).
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plaintiff could successfully argue corporate negligence. Current tort law
requires a health care provider to gather such information carefully, as the
standard of care evolves toward systematic data collection of outcomes,
and to monitor regularly the outcomes of individual physicians. A properly designed outcome measurement system, using data mining techniques, will produce data as to unnecessary procedures, high error rates
and other early warnings of problems with a staff physician.8 6 The existence of such a process will give a hospital actual notice of a problem,
leading to liability.8 7 A hospital is under a duty to restrict the clinical privileges of staff physicians who are incompetent to handle certain procedures, and to detect concealment by a staff doctor of medical errors.
While some courts have limited this duty to only those situations where a
hospital has learned of physician insufficiencies, 8 8 others have talked of
"negligent supervision" in terms of an affirmative duty to detect
89
problems.
Data mining is likely to produce firm statistical distributions that will
allow the generation of inferences, akin to those of res ipsa loquitur, that a
patient injury is more properly attributable to provider negligence than
innocent explanations, recognizing the increased statistical likelihood that
a provider is to blame in the particular case. Whether a court would be
willing to use such data in a negligence case as the basis for a res ipsa
86. Critics point out a variety of problems with requiring disclosure of such
data at present. First, because data is never perfect-given different patient conditions-use of data may shift patients away from a poorer provider or affect its reimbursement. This will lead to gaming the system, if possible, as providers scramble
to adversely select against poorer cases in order to improve their track record.
Second, quality differences may not always be fixable. Some doctors will be better
and some organizations are better managed. Self-improvement based on data will
fall short where poor management cannot recognize bad processes. Third, we will
always have to make tradeoffs between more or less effective care and its cost. The
tradeoff between uncertainty and cost will always remain. Fourth, some relatively
good providers will suffer because of invidious performance comparisons, given
imperfect data and patient variation. Some good providers will therefore be
lumped with the larger pool of incompetent or less competent providers. For criticisms of medical performance statistics and cautions that provider-specific outcome statistics must be carefully evaluated to insure their reliability and validity
when used as evidence, see, for example, Jesse Green, Problems in the Use of Outcome
Statistics to Compare Health Care Providers, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 55 (1992); Rheingold,
supra note 54.
87. See Cronic v. Doud, 523 N.E.2d 176, 178-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (showing
case where unnecessary surgery by physician should have been detected by hospital
through utilization review, because it had data to put it on notice of problem).
Contra Reynolds v. Mennonite Hosp., 522 N.E.2d 827, 829-30 (Il1. App. Ct. 1988),
reh'g denied, 530 N.E.2d 264 (Ill. 1988) (granting summary judgment for hospital
on same facts as Cronic v. Doud, but plaintiff had not pleaded utilization review
data).
88. See Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1046 (Ohio 1990) ("Nor is a
hospital required to constantly supervise and second-guess the activities of its physicians, beyond the duty to remove a known incompetent.").
89. See, e.g., Oehler v. Humana, Inc., 775 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Nev. 1989) (discussing what is necessary to prove negligent supervision).
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instruction is another question, but certainly one worth arguing if the data
is made available and peer review privilege or other statutory immunities
are not available as a defense.
Another possible consequence of systematic data mining is that variable provider performance will be discovered, as the staff privilege cases
above have indicated. This may lead to a recommendation that physician
performance be tested and reevaluated regularly. One author, Sissela
Bok, has argued that we should treat doctors as seriously as we treat pilots,
recognizing the lives they can affect if they are slipping in competence or
have other problems in their lives. 90
Current tort law requires a health care provider to gather such information carefully, as the standard of care evolves toward systematic data
collection of outcomes, and to monitor regularly the outcomes of individual physicians. A properly designed utilization review process within an
institution will produce data as to unnecessary procedures, high error
rates and other early warnings of problems with a staff physician. The
existence of such a process will give a hospital actual notice of a problem,
leading to liability. A hospital is also under a duty to restrict the clinical
privileges of staff physicians who are incompetent to handle certain procedures and to detect concealment by a staff doctor of medical errors. 91
B.

Patient Safety and Quality Improvement ActIs Concealment the Likely Result?

Modest JCAHO and Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) reporting requirements and audits strive to create a state of "forced
mindfulness" by providers, as the data forces feedback as to sources of bad
outcomes and the resulting ability to fix problems.9 2 The proliferation of
state error reporting legislation clearly is designed to push hospitals to
track adverse events and near misses resulting from hospital treatment and
report to the state, and often to the patient. The federal effort until recently, however, has been quite modest. The 2005 Patient Safety and
Quality Improvement Act (the "Act") is one of several new federal initiatives to promote data generation and disclosure within hospitals. The Act
authorizes the creation of "patient safety organizations" that will conduct
90. One commentator notes:
For while alcoholism and related conditions afflict persons in every walk
of life, they cause the disabled physician to be especially dangerous. People can deteriorate in many kinds of work; but the effects, while serious in
the long run, will rarely be as catastrophic for innocent victims as when a
false diagnosis is made, the wrong medication prescribed, or incompetent surgery performed.
SISSEtA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRrVATE LIFE 165 (1978).
91. See Lo v. Provena Covenant Med. Ctr., 796 N.E.2d 607, 614 (11. App. Ct.
2003) (finding that "hospital has an inherent right to summarily suspend the
clinical privileges of a physician whose continued practice poses an immediate
danger to patients").
92. See generally Furrow, supra note 33.
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"patient safety activities" within hospitals and other health care institutions.9 3 Such patient safety work product is any data, reports, records,
memoranda, analysis or written or oral statements "which could result in
94
improved patient safety, health care quality, or health care outcomes."
The heart of this new legislation is the federal certification of patient
safety organizations (PSOs), governed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, which is good for three years. These PSOs would collect reports of medical errors voluntarily submitted by health care
providers for inclusion in a patient safety network of databases. Results
would be analyzed and disseminated to providers including recommendations, protocols or other guidelines describing best practices.
The Act creates a federal privilege for patient safety work product,
preempting states' laws governing civil or administrative procedures that
require the disclosure of information by a health care provider to a certified PSO. Providers could report voluntarily and confidentially all errors
through a "Patient Safety Work Product (PSWP)" to a certified PSO. Such
work products are not subject to discovery, disclosure under the Freedom
of Information Act, admissibility in any Federal, state or local government
proceeding or disciplinary proceeding under state law. They are also confidential and may not be disclosed. Exceptions to confidentiality include
disclosure to carry out patient safety activities, non-identifiable patient
safety work product, to grantees for research, demonstration projects and
so on. JCAHO is specifically considered, as the Act expressly allows
"[v]oluntary disclosure of patient safety work product by a provider to an
accrediting body that accredits the provider." 9 5 The Act also provides
that:
A patient safety organization shall not be compelled to disclose
information collected or developed under this part whether or
not such information is patient safety work product unless such
information is identified, is not patient safety work product, and
96
is not reasonably available from another source.
Further, the Act specifies that:
An accrediting body shall not take an accrediting action against a
provider based on the good faith participation of the provider in
the collection, development, reporting, or maintenance of patient safety work product in accordance with this part. An accrediting body may not require a provider to reveal its
93. See Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 10941, § 924, 119 Stat. 424, 431-34 (2005) (describing process for entities to become
patient safety organizations).
94. Id. § 921 (7) (A) (i) (II), 119 Stat. 426.
95. Id. § 922(c) (2) (E), 119 Stat. 428.
96. Id. § 922(d) (4) (A) (i), 119 Stat. 428-29.
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communication with any patient safety organization established
97
in accordance with this part.
The new Act provides no mandate for systematic data collection by
providers, nor any reimbursement for it. It does not compel use of data in
any kind of national reporting system. Moreover, it fails to make a serious
and systematic attempt to tie performance to solid measurements and to

reimbursement. 9 8 Hospitals or their medical staffs are likely to want to
take advantage of the immunities provided, however, and will establish
their own PSOs for their own confidential and privileged safety program.
This is bound to have a positive effect on data gathering and performance
measurements. 99 This new legislation may even have the effect of accelerating the use of data mining and its consequences within institutions, even
though its primary thrust is the creation of a federal privilege for patient
safety work products.

V.

CONCLUSION

Physicians should welcome mining of aggregate data. The focus will
shift from their habits, proclivities and politics, to their performance.
Therefore, the HIV-positive physician, the older doctor and the substance
abuser, will be measured more by the measurable risks they create, and
less by their status. There will be surprises, but also repairable situations
for some physicians. Ultimately, patient care is bound to benefit. Hospitals may have no choice but to welcome data mining, whether they like it
or not. The inexorable pressures of HIPAA, of Medicare reimbursement
pressures and state adverse event disclosure laws, all suggest that data mining is a useful tool along with systematic error and near miss disclosure
requirements, for detecting patterns of patient harm. Hospitals should
aspire to zero defects, just as the best industries do.

97. Id. § 922 (d) (4) (B), 119 Stat. 429.
98. See AM. MED. Ass'N, SUMMARY OF S. 544, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/
pub/category/15341.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2006) (providing synopsis of major
provisions of Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005).
99. See

PATIENT SAFETY NETWORK, AGENCY

FOR HEALTHCARE

RESEARcH AND

QUALITY, http://psnet.ahrq.gov (last visited Apr. 22, 2006) (providing new national web-based resource featuring latest news and resources on patient safety,
including weekly updates of patient safety literature, news, tools and meetings).
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